Hey guys,
I just found a very interesting video about the Nile and the whole water conflict. It is a 10 min video, so just have a look! In my opinion, it explains the situation pretty good and it is based on scientific research (at least that is what they pretend). So, maybe there also some interesting and new facts for you and you can increase your knowledge about this issue.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioQoI76f804
Friday, 16 December 2016
Sunday, 11 December 2016
Case study: Burkina Faso
Hey guys,
after introducing you to different aspects about this whole topic, I would like to focus on a case study from Burkina Faso. It is about a dam, which has been built in the 1990's, and I want to link it to some of my earlier posts.
The Moussodougou dam (also known as Comoé dam) is a dam on the Comoé river in Moussodougou, Burkina Faso. The dam was built in 1991 and has a capacity of 35,000,000 cubic metres (BAZIN et al. 2011:68). Many different groups used the water of the river before the dam was built and the largest ones were the SN-SOSUCO (sugar production), rice growers, market gardeners, and fruit tree owners. 46 per cent of the sugar consumed in Burkina Faso is nowadays produced in this area, so it is (and was) a very important economic region for Burkina Faso (BAZIN et al. 2011: 68). But there were already some problems even before the dam was built. Due to the production of sugar and the power of SN-SOSUCO, many farmers lost their farmland during the early 1970's. SN-SOSUCO was established in 1965 and nowadays it is the second largest employer after the state in Burkina Faso (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 702).
The main reason for the construction of the dam was the economic power of SN-SOSUCO. They wanted to regulate the water flow so that they can increase their production (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70). After the dam was built, the state handed the control over the dam over to SN-SOSUCO and from then on they were responsible for ensuring its maintenance and supervision. The costs for maintenance and so on are actually paid by the state. So, a good deal for SN-SOSUCO (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70).
SN-SOSUCO is, of course, the largest consumer of water from the dam. But for other user groups there have not been an increase in production. The impact on agricultural production is very limited, as there is too less water for irrigation during the dry season (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70). But of course, the dam caused changes in everyday life of the users and thus the number of conflicts in this area increased after the dam was built. The main problem is that conflicts between arable and livestock farmers increased. The livestock farmers use the reservoir as a water source for their cattle but unfortunately there are only a few access routes thus they often cross areas in which arable farmers are growing their products (BAZIN et al. 2011: 72). Of course those conflicts are not very gratifying but as I have shown you before, conflicts on the local level are often solved by local mechanisms or communities. And that is also the case for those conflicts.
Another issue is the relationship between different users of the dam and SN-SOSUCO. As SN-SOSUCO mainly uses the dam for its own purposes, the company is (of course) not really interested in concerns of other users. In 2006 for example, SN-SOSUCO refused to release water out of the dam during the dry season (because the water level was too low) and consequently many farmers lost their harvests. There have also been protest marches in 2008, where farmers tried to show their anger about the water management of SN-SOSUCO (BAZIN et al. 2011: 72).
But the dam also brought some new economic activities and fishing got more and more important in this region (BAZIN et al. 2011: 74). The reservoir is well suited for fishing but so far, this economic activity is monopolised by a small group of people (BAZIN et al. 2011; 75).
As I said in the beginning, I would like to link this case study to some other posts I made so far. Many of you may have recognised the issue about the conflict between arable and livestock farmers. That is a good example for how conflicts are solved on the local level. Often, people know each other and they do not really want to have any trouble, although they also want their idea of living to become true. But local mechanisms, as I have showed earlier, are often very purposeful especially when both parties really depend on a useful outcome.
Another point, which I would like to link to earlier posts is the case about the CLE (Comité Local de l’Eau de la Haute Comoé) (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 706; BAZIN et al. 2011: 76). The CLE is a local water committee and was formed in March 2008. Its main goal is to coordinate water use between the different groups and it is welcomed by most of the water users (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 706). SN-SOSUCO used to make all decisions about the dam on its own and of course, they only focused on their own purposes. The CLE as an official institution tries to pay attention to all water users and each group is represented in the committee (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 707). Unfortunately, the number of representatives differs from group to group and depends on social recognition, and the legitimacy and priority of the claims of single groups. As a result, the fishermen for example only have on representative and it can be doubted that their interests are heard in an appropriate way (although the author does not say how many representatives there are in total) (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 707).
To conclude, this case study shows some interesting points which I have already shown you before in a more theoretical way. Conflicts can have many different faces and sometimes it is a conflcit between local groups, and sometimes it is one between local groups and industries. The establishment of committees (no matter on which scale) is always a good way for paying attention to all users/stakeholders and this way of managing the situation can bring the best result. But there have to be committees or organisations like the CLE, otherwise there will not be a satisfying solution.
after introducing you to different aspects about this whole topic, I would like to focus on a case study from Burkina Faso. It is about a dam, which has been built in the 1990's, and I want to link it to some of my earlier posts.
The Moussodougou dam (also known as Comoé dam) is a dam on the Comoé river in Moussodougou, Burkina Faso. The dam was built in 1991 and has a capacity of 35,000,000 cubic metres (BAZIN et al. 2011:68). Many different groups used the water of the river before the dam was built and the largest ones were the SN-SOSUCO (sugar production), rice growers, market gardeners, and fruit tree owners. 46 per cent of the sugar consumed in Burkina Faso is nowadays produced in this area, so it is (and was) a very important economic region for Burkina Faso (BAZIN et al. 2011: 68). But there were already some problems even before the dam was built. Due to the production of sugar and the power of SN-SOSUCO, many farmers lost their farmland during the early 1970's. SN-SOSUCO was established in 1965 and nowadays it is the second largest employer after the state in Burkina Faso (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 702).
study area (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 697) |
The main reason for the construction of the dam was the economic power of SN-SOSUCO. They wanted to regulate the water flow so that they can increase their production (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70). After the dam was built, the state handed the control over the dam over to SN-SOSUCO and from then on they were responsible for ensuring its maintenance and supervision. The costs for maintenance and so on are actually paid by the state. So, a good deal for SN-SOSUCO (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70).
SN-SOSUCO is, of course, the largest consumer of water from the dam. But for other user groups there have not been an increase in production. The impact on agricultural production is very limited, as there is too less water for irrigation during the dry season (BAZIN et al. 2011: 70). But of course, the dam caused changes in everyday life of the users and thus the number of conflicts in this area increased after the dam was built. The main problem is that conflicts between arable and livestock farmers increased. The livestock farmers use the reservoir as a water source for their cattle but unfortunately there are only a few access routes thus they often cross areas in which arable farmers are growing their products (BAZIN et al. 2011: 72). Of course those conflicts are not very gratifying but as I have shown you before, conflicts on the local level are often solved by local mechanisms or communities. And that is also the case for those conflicts.
Another issue is the relationship between different users of the dam and SN-SOSUCO. As SN-SOSUCO mainly uses the dam for its own purposes, the company is (of course) not really interested in concerns of other users. In 2006 for example, SN-SOSUCO refused to release water out of the dam during the dry season (because the water level was too low) and consequently many farmers lost their harvests. There have also been protest marches in 2008, where farmers tried to show their anger about the water management of SN-SOSUCO (BAZIN et al. 2011: 72).
But the dam also brought some new economic activities and fishing got more and more important in this region (BAZIN et al. 2011: 74). The reservoir is well suited for fishing but so far, this economic activity is monopolised by a small group of people (BAZIN et al. 2011; 75).
As I said in the beginning, I would like to link this case study to some other posts I made so far. Many of you may have recognised the issue about the conflict between arable and livestock farmers. That is a good example for how conflicts are solved on the local level. Often, people know each other and they do not really want to have any trouble, although they also want their idea of living to become true. But local mechanisms, as I have showed earlier, are often very purposeful especially when both parties really depend on a useful outcome.
Another point, which I would like to link to earlier posts is the case about the CLE (Comité Local de l’Eau de la Haute Comoé) (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 706; BAZIN et al. 2011: 76). The CLE is a local water committee and was formed in March 2008. Its main goal is to coordinate water use between the different groups and it is welcomed by most of the water users (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 706). SN-SOSUCO used to make all decisions about the dam on its own and of course, they only focused on their own purposes. The CLE as an official institution tries to pay attention to all water users and each group is represented in the committee (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 707). Unfortunately, the number of representatives differs from group to group and depends on social recognition, and the legitimacy and priority of the claims of single groups. As a result, the fishermen for example only have on representative and it can be doubted that their interests are heard in an appropriate way (although the author does not say how many representatives there are in total) (RONCOLI et al. 2009: 707).
To conclude, this case study shows some interesting points which I have already shown you before in a more theoretical way. Conflicts can have many different faces and sometimes it is a conflcit between local groups, and sometimes it is one between local groups and industries. The establishment of committees (no matter on which scale) is always a good way for paying attention to all users/stakeholders and this way of managing the situation can bring the best result. But there have to be committees or organisations like the CLE, otherwise there will not be a satisfying solution.
Wednesday, 7 December 2016
Transboundary cooperation for preventing conflicts
Hey guys,
with my last post I tried to highlight the importance of transboundary co-operation when it comes to water resources management. As I have shown, the situation in Southern Africa is very complex and complex problems often need complex solutions. I already mentioned the SADC (Southern African Development Community) and in this post, I would like to dig a bit deeper and show you guys how the framework of such a co-operation looks like. Therefore, I read two articles, one about the SADC and one about the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
As I already mentioned in the last post, the SADC consists of many states in Southern Africa and they try to co-operate in many different areas. Their framework for regional co-operation in integrated water resources management is already really strong and they try to include many different issues into their framework as they want to solve the "water problem" in a holistic way (KANIARU 2015: 387). The different nation states signed the first protocol on shared watercourse systems on the 23rd of August 1995 but revised it a couple of times because the original versions had multiple shortcomings. Another reason why the changed it, is that the international water law changed over years and developed further, which resulted out of the United Nations convention in 1997 (KANIARU 2015: 387). The main objective of the SADC is a closer co-operation for a sustainable and co-ordinated water management, and the protection and utilisation of shared watercourses (KANIARU 2015:388). The foundation for their co-operation is that all states are equal, and that they share the values of solidarity, peace, and security (KANIARU 2015: 389). If there are any disputes, a central authority will try to solve those. The member states also introduced many different instruments with which they try to reach their goals. The most important ones are a regional water policy, harmonisation of legal and regulatory framework for water management, and different programmes which should provide the opportunity for training and capacity building in integrated water resources management (KANIARU 2015: 389). But of course, there are many different challenges which the community has to face (KANIARU 2015: 391). The most important one is that the states did not really decide to work together because they wanted to but the nature just forced them to work together. If we compare this to the European Union (EU) the problems become obvious. At first, I do not want to say that everything is fine in the EU (of course it is not). But the case is that different states decided to work together because they share the same values (more or less) and have the same goals so they decided (on their own) to join the EU because they just wanted it. The case for the SADC is a bit different. The states were just forced to co-operate because otherwise they would have faced even bigger challenges. But there are many different legal systems, economic and developmental situations, and different colonial heritages as well. So, one big challenge, before you even start working, is to reach an agreement on your co-operation and what the co-operation should look like. Another challenge is the lack of adequate financial support, and human resources which is of course a big problem for transboundary cooperation.
To present this topic in a more comprehensive way to you, I would like to present another co-operation scheme in Africa. The NBI consists of ten different states (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) and was founded due to a proposal for more co-operation in the area of water management in 1992 (BELAY et al. 2010: 8). The main goals of this organisation are to develop water resources of the Nile Basin in a more sustainable and equitable way, to ensure prosperity, security, and peace, to ensure efficient water managememt, and to tackle poverty and promote economic integration (BELAY et al. 2010: 9). The governments of the different member states developed a strategic action program which includes various thematic projects (environment, water, social economic development, confidence building, regional power trade, agriculture, applied training) (BELAY et al. 2010: 10). Of course, the NBI also faces a lot of different challenges which are for example a lack of coordination between/with other regional institutions, the World bank participation or the Nile Basin water treaty of 1929 (BELAY 2010: 13). The participation of the World bank is in so far problematic, as their measures are often very unsuccessful and not very popular especially in very poor countries. Unfortunately, six out of the ten poorest countries in the world are member states of the NBI (BELAY 2010:13). As a result, the participation of the World bank is often seen as a problem and not really as a solution. Another problem which I just mentioned is the Nile Basin water treaty of 1929. To say it in a nutshell: this treaty was made during the time of colonisation and gave Egypt a lot of power when it comes to the distribution of the water of the Nile (BELAY 2010: 13, CASCAO 2009:245). Of course, this is not a fruitful foundation for a successful co-operation.
When we compare the two different co-operation schemes we have to consider one very important point: the NBI is not a recognized river basin organisation (RBO) (BELAY 2010: 14). That is a very important fact because it basically means, that all the nice goals for the co-operation of the countries are not binding. All of their goals and main objectives sound like they could solve all of their problems in three weeks time but the different countries are not really forced to follow those. And as I already showed you with one of my blog posts (the one about the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia) conflicts can still take place even though they are all members of one co-operation project. A real binding framework is needed with a central authority which is able to solve conflicts even before they are expanding. Otherwise you only have a nice looking fancy transboundary co-operation without any impact on the real problem...
with my last post I tried to highlight the importance of transboundary co-operation when it comes to water resources management. As I have shown, the situation in Southern Africa is very complex and complex problems often need complex solutions. I already mentioned the SADC (Southern African Development Community) and in this post, I would like to dig a bit deeper and show you guys how the framework of such a co-operation looks like. Therefore, I read two articles, one about the SADC and one about the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
As I already mentioned in the last post, the SADC consists of many states in Southern Africa and they try to co-operate in many different areas. Their framework for regional co-operation in integrated water resources management is already really strong and they try to include many different issues into their framework as they want to solve the "water problem" in a holistic way (KANIARU 2015: 387). The different nation states signed the first protocol on shared watercourse systems on the 23rd of August 1995 but revised it a couple of times because the original versions had multiple shortcomings. Another reason why the changed it, is that the international water law changed over years and developed further, which resulted out of the United Nations convention in 1997 (KANIARU 2015: 387). The main objective of the SADC is a closer co-operation for a sustainable and co-ordinated water management, and the protection and utilisation of shared watercourses (KANIARU 2015:388). The foundation for their co-operation is that all states are equal, and that they share the values of solidarity, peace, and security (KANIARU 2015: 389). If there are any disputes, a central authority will try to solve those. The member states also introduced many different instruments with which they try to reach their goals. The most important ones are a regional water policy, harmonisation of legal and regulatory framework for water management, and different programmes which should provide the opportunity for training and capacity building in integrated water resources management (KANIARU 2015: 389). But of course, there are many different challenges which the community has to face (KANIARU 2015: 391). The most important one is that the states did not really decide to work together because they wanted to but the nature just forced them to work together. If we compare this to the European Union (EU) the problems become obvious. At first, I do not want to say that everything is fine in the EU (of course it is not). But the case is that different states decided to work together because they share the same values (more or less) and have the same goals so they decided (on their own) to join the EU because they just wanted it. The case for the SADC is a bit different. The states were just forced to co-operate because otherwise they would have faced even bigger challenges. But there are many different legal systems, economic and developmental situations, and different colonial heritages as well. So, one big challenge, before you even start working, is to reach an agreement on your co-operation and what the co-operation should look like. Another challenge is the lack of adequate financial support, and human resources which is of course a big problem for transboundary cooperation.
To present this topic in a more comprehensive way to you, I would like to present another co-operation scheme in Africa. The NBI consists of ten different states (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) and was founded due to a proposal for more co-operation in the area of water management in 1992 (BELAY et al. 2010: 8). The main goals of this organisation are to develop water resources of the Nile Basin in a more sustainable and equitable way, to ensure prosperity, security, and peace, to ensure efficient water managememt, and to tackle poverty and promote economic integration (BELAY et al. 2010: 9). The governments of the different member states developed a strategic action program which includes various thematic projects (environment, water, social economic development, confidence building, regional power trade, agriculture, applied training) (BELAY et al. 2010: 10). Of course, the NBI also faces a lot of different challenges which are for example a lack of coordination between/with other regional institutions, the World bank participation or the Nile Basin water treaty of 1929 (BELAY 2010: 13). The participation of the World bank is in so far problematic, as their measures are often very unsuccessful and not very popular especially in very poor countries. Unfortunately, six out of the ten poorest countries in the world are member states of the NBI (BELAY 2010:13). As a result, the participation of the World bank is often seen as a problem and not really as a solution. Another problem which I just mentioned is the Nile Basin water treaty of 1929. To say it in a nutshell: this treaty was made during the time of colonisation and gave Egypt a lot of power when it comes to the distribution of the water of the Nile (BELAY 2010: 13, CASCAO 2009:245). Of course, this is not a fruitful foundation for a successful co-operation.
Member states of SADC (https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%C3%BCdafrikanische_Entwicklungsgemeinschaft#/media/File:SADC-Staaten.png) |
When we compare the two different co-operation schemes we have to consider one very important point: the NBI is not a recognized river basin organisation (RBO) (BELAY 2010: 14). That is a very important fact because it basically means, that all the nice goals for the co-operation of the countries are not binding. All of their goals and main objectives sound like they could solve all of their problems in three weeks time but the different countries are not really forced to follow those. And as I already showed you with one of my blog posts (the one about the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia) conflicts can still take place even though they are all members of one co-operation project. A real binding framework is needed with a central authority which is able to solve conflicts even before they are expanding. Otherwise you only have a nice looking fancy transboundary co-operation without any impact on the real problem...
Saturday, 3 December 2016
International cooperation
Hey guys,
with this post I want to highlight the importance of international cooperation when it comes to possible conflicts about water. Therefore, I read three articles which show (partly) different opinions on this topic.
All of them focus on transboundary river basins and possible conflicts about the water use. Swatuk for example argues that there is in general more will for cooperation between two or more countries than a will for a conflict when it comes to the use of water (SWATUK 2015:215). As an example he uses the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which consists of 15 member states in Southern Africa. He makes clear that this part of the world has, like many other parts of the world as well, a long history of different conflicts (SWATUK 2015:217). The main reasons for conflicts in this area have been questions about land tenure and resources. Nowadays, the Southern African states share 15 river basins and six of them were labeled as basins which are potential objects of conflicts in 2003 (Cunene, Inkomati, Limpopo, Orange-Sengu, Okavango, Zambezi, according to the World Bank: global hotspots) (SWATUK 2015:218). So far, there have not been a conflict about any of these.
In contrast to this example, the author's main argument is that states with endemic water scarcity are more likely to cooperate with other states than to have a conflict with them (SWATUK 2015:218). Reasons for this are that it is in general the best solution for the future of a country but also that many different actors are involved in water management and therefore a dominance of regional cooperation exists (SWATUK 2015:218. The author also kind of criticizes that there is always this standard argument that you do not know what will happen in the future and there could be conflicts about water (SWATUK 2015:220). In his opinion cooperation will be the solution also in future time as there is no other useful solution. In this context he also claims that not all peaceful relationships are good relationships and not all conflictful relationships are bad relationships in general.
Some additional information about this topic can be found in an article written by Turton et al. At first, they indicate the international river basins as a consequence of the colonial legacy (TURTON et al 2006:22). They also offer some very interesting and impressive data about that. There are 263 known international river basins in the world and 63 of them are in Africa. These river basins (the ones in Africa) cover two-thirds of the total African land area and they are home to three-quarters of the entire African population. In total, they provide 93% of surface water resources on the continent (TURTON et al. 2006:23). These impressive statistics show how important water management is. And they also show the difference between the two articles. While Swatuk mainly focuses on cooperation and states that everything will be solved with international cooperation, Turton et al. try to highlight the importance of the water problem of the African continent. That does not mean that they want to say that there will be conflicts in future time, but they say that there is the possibility of conflicts and a holistic water management, and international cooperation is needed to prevent them. They also claim that cooperation between states is the best solution for regions with endemic water scarcity but at the same time they argue that the cooperations made so far are not enough. Most of them only focus on surface water and only a few also include groundwater (TURTON et al. 2006:29).
Kaniaru gives another insight into this topic. She shows the interdependence between the different countries very well and thus she adds another dimension to this issue. She argues, that South Africa is responsible for 80% of Southern African water use, but at the same time the country is home to one-third of the region's population only, and has only about 10% of the total water resources of Southern Africa (KANIARU 2015:383). Another interesting point is that four countries (of SADC; Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) have already reached the maximum of their available water resources. In addition to this, many countries heavily rely on river basins in other countries. For example, 94% of river flows in Botswana originate in other countries. An interesting example from Zimbabwe shows that surface water is the most important source of the country's water supply (90% of water supply come from surface water)(KANIARU 2015:383).
If we link the three different articles there are some interesting results. All of them agree that cooperation about water use is the best solution for everyone. That has been the case in the past and it will probably be the case in future times. But especially the last article, which I just introduced to you, shows how complicated the interdependences are and that there is a lot of potential for conflicts (SWATUK would now say that is the standard argument). But the statistics Kaniaru offers, show how important the work, which countries and NGO's are doing, is and that a lot of will to cooperation will be needed in future times.
In my next post I will focus on some more of the consequences of these facts and will also give you some more historical context about cooperation and so on.
Feel free to comment!
with this post I want to highlight the importance of international cooperation when it comes to possible conflicts about water. Therefore, I read three articles which show (partly) different opinions on this topic.
All of them focus on transboundary river basins and possible conflicts about the water use. Swatuk for example argues that there is in general more will for cooperation between two or more countries than a will for a conflict when it comes to the use of water (SWATUK 2015:215). As an example he uses the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which consists of 15 member states in Southern Africa. He makes clear that this part of the world has, like many other parts of the world as well, a long history of different conflicts (SWATUK 2015:217). The main reasons for conflicts in this area have been questions about land tenure and resources. Nowadays, the Southern African states share 15 river basins and six of them were labeled as basins which are potential objects of conflicts in 2003 (Cunene, Inkomati, Limpopo, Orange-Sengu, Okavango, Zambezi, according to the World Bank: global hotspots) (SWATUK 2015:218). So far, there have not been a conflict about any of these.
In contrast to this example, the author's main argument is that states with endemic water scarcity are more likely to cooperate with other states than to have a conflict with them (SWATUK 2015:218). Reasons for this are that it is in general the best solution for the future of a country but also that many different actors are involved in water management and therefore a dominance of regional cooperation exists (SWATUK 2015:218. The author also kind of criticizes that there is always this standard argument that you do not know what will happen in the future and there could be conflicts about water (SWATUK 2015:220). In his opinion cooperation will be the solution also in future time as there is no other useful solution. In this context he also claims that not all peaceful relationships are good relationships and not all conflictful relationships are bad relationships in general.
Some additional information about this topic can be found in an article written by Turton et al. At first, they indicate the international river basins as a consequence of the colonial legacy (TURTON et al 2006:22). They also offer some very interesting and impressive data about that. There are 263 known international river basins in the world and 63 of them are in Africa. These river basins (the ones in Africa) cover two-thirds of the total African land area and they are home to three-quarters of the entire African population. In total, they provide 93% of surface water resources on the continent (TURTON et al. 2006:23). These impressive statistics show how important water management is. And they also show the difference between the two articles. While Swatuk mainly focuses on cooperation and states that everything will be solved with international cooperation, Turton et al. try to highlight the importance of the water problem of the African continent. That does not mean that they want to say that there will be conflicts in future time, but they say that there is the possibility of conflicts and a holistic water management, and international cooperation is needed to prevent them. They also claim that cooperation between states is the best solution for regions with endemic water scarcity but at the same time they argue that the cooperations made so far are not enough. Most of them only focus on surface water and only a few also include groundwater (TURTON et al. 2006:29).
Kaniaru gives another insight into this topic. She shows the interdependence between the different countries very well and thus she adds another dimension to this issue. She argues, that South Africa is responsible for 80% of Southern African water use, but at the same time the country is home to one-third of the region's population only, and has only about 10% of the total water resources of Southern Africa (KANIARU 2015:383). Another interesting point is that four countries (of SADC; Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) have already reached the maximum of their available water resources. In addition to this, many countries heavily rely on river basins in other countries. For example, 94% of river flows in Botswana originate in other countries. An interesting example from Zimbabwe shows that surface water is the most important source of the country's water supply (90% of water supply come from surface water)(KANIARU 2015:383).
If we link the three different articles there are some interesting results. All of them agree that cooperation about water use is the best solution for everyone. That has been the case in the past and it will probably be the case in future times. But especially the last article, which I just introduced to you, shows how complicated the interdependences are and that there is a lot of potential for conflicts (SWATUK would now say that is the standard argument). But the statistics Kaniaru offers, show how important the work, which countries and NGO's are doing, is and that a lot of will to cooperation will be needed in future times.
In my next post I will focus on some more of the consequences of these facts and will also give you some more historical context about cooperation and so on.
Feel free to comment!
Monday, 28 November 2016
Transition: Rainfall variability, violence, solutions
After my last post, I wanted to
focus on water conflicts and how it is possible to solve them. During my
literature search I found an interesting article which kind of connects the
different topics I already talked about and topics I want to talk about in
upcoming posts. The article is called “Rainfall variability and violence in
rural Kenya: investigating the effects of drought and the role of local
institutions with survey data” (article) and tries to link multiple questions
about this topic. Linke et al. investigate the connection between droughts and
conflicts but they also explore the role of local and national institutions
within these conflicts and how successful they are with their measures. Therefore,
the article offers a perfect transition to the question how water conflicts can
be solved.
Linke et
al. choose a different approach (different from the one I presented in my first
post) and so they include different determinants for identifying the
relationship between water scarcity and conflicts. They know about the complex
relationship and so they interviewed 504 individuals in three rural Kenyan
counties. So in contrast to the research which I presented to you in my first
post, they do not (primarily) use statistics and geospatial data for their
research. They interviewed individuals from many different social
(pastoralists, agricultural groups) and ethnic (Kikuyu (post 2), Kalenjin, Luo)
groups from different ecological areas in Kenya. Linke et al. chose Kenya for
their research because it is a political stable country and thus there are not
too many conflicts which could affect the outcome of their interviews.
Furthermore, Kenya is a country with many different environmental zones and
different ethnic groups which will offer many different opinions about that
topic and thus a more or less representative result (Linke et al. 2015:39).
The main
goal of Linke et al. is to offer some new approaches to the existing research
about this issue. On the one hand, they want to offer an approach which
connects the individual and household level with large samples and on the other
hand they want to show that the link between climate change and violence takes
place in certain social contexts (Linke et al. 2015:37).
To do their
research, Linke et al. make three propositions for their research (Linke et al. 2015:39):
-
They
say, that where droughts are more often, support for use of violence will be
higher than in other regions where drought are less frequent
-
They
say, that governments regulating the use of natural resources will reduce
support for use of violence
-
They
say, that the presence of intercommunity dialogues can reduce the support for
use of violence
During
their interviews, they used standard question which are also used for the
Afrobarometer survey. They also tried to explain their research very detailed
so that interviewed persons are hopefully more honest and not too much
influenced by social desirability. They then created different models and also
added different determinants like age, education, and gender because all of
them can affect the outcome of the research.
Their results are clearly. They find
no support for their propositions 1 and 2. That means that people think there
is no support for use of violence during droughts and they also think that
governments do not have an impact on reducing the support for use of violence.
But Linke
et al. make clear that proposition 3 can be seen as true. Many interviewed
persons said that community dialogues are very important when it comes to
managing conflicts during a drought. Consequently, this informal “institution”
is more purposeful than any government institution. According to Linke et al.
that is the case because local dialogues are more flexible and adaptive to
changing circumstances and consequently more useful for solving problems
(Linke et al. 2015:42).
But what are the consequences of
these findings?
First, this case study shows that
many people in Kenya obviously have the feeling that the government does not
have many measures for solving water conflicts. Even though it might not be
true, people (in this case) trust more in their local dialogues than in their
government. These local dialogues might work in many (maybe most) cases but it
is still necessary that governments also take their responsibility in local
conflicts.
For this,
they need more flexible institutions which know local patterns and which can
deal with different ethnic and social groups. In many cases, you can trust in self-responsibility
of communities but not always and therefore you need measures which can help to
reduce the risk of an outbreak of a conflict.
This
research and its results also show that water conflicts are still not really
seen as such a big problem nowadays and for the future. Of course, many different problems can lead to
a conflict but water can be one of these problems thus a holistic solution for
this whole problem is needed. Otherwise governments and nation states will face even more
problems in future time. If governments are not able to provide a sufficient solution for the distribution of water (and other resources) more and more conflicts will be the
result. Of course this is a huge job but it has to be done now...
As always: Feel free to comment on my post and ask questions!
Monday, 21 November 2016
Somali civil war and its water dimension
After explaining the relationship
between water shortages and violent conflicts and showing different scales in
which these conflicts can take place, I want to go a bit into detail and
highlight one specific conflict to show the importance of water once again.
With this post, I would like to emphasize the interconnections of different
dimensions within a conflict.
But, no worries guys, this post will
be the last one in which I talk about just one single conflict. In the upcoming
blog entries I will focus on other questions.
The conflict which I want to use to
show you the complexities of the whole topic is the civil war in Somalia (Some background information). It is
(unfortunately) a well-known one because it (unfortunately again) already has a
long history with a lot of horrible incidents which happened during this time. The
media around the world are reporting a lot about this conflict and as a result
they give an insight into the different dimensions of this war. But often, they
only focus on the very spectacular topics like Islamism or Pirates but they
leave out a lot of other dimensions.
The civil war grew out of conflicts
during the early 1980’s and since then different parties are fighting each
other in the East-African state. This conflict has a lot of different
dimensions and there are a couple of reasons why it is still ongoing. The first
reason is the clan system in the Somali society. The whole society is divided
into different clans with different lifestyles and different opinions and
claims. But the majority of these clans have one thing in common: They do not
accept a centralized political power. And as a result, many of them do not
accept the government and they have their own political organization. Of
course, this leads to many conflicts between the different clans and conflicts
between the clans and the state. As already mentioned, all clans have different
plans for the development of Somalia (or single regions) and an agreement on
single topics between different clans is hard to make.
Another issue of this conflict is
Islamism. This topic is of increasing importance in Somalia, as many different
groups are fighting for their islamistic ideas and objectives (for example
Al-Shabaab or since 2015 the Islamic state).
Another point which is part of the
complexity of this conflict are military interventions from other countries. Several
countries took part in this conflict and intervened in it. One example for
these countries is Ethiopia, which supported different groups in Somalia several
times (e.g. 2007). Another example is the international community which also
took part in this conflict (UN mission 1992-1995). All these interventions
caused additional trouble and did not really solve the problem.
But finally, I want to get to the
point we are all interested in: Water. As I already mentioned, the media often
only reports about topics which are more or less easy to explain as well as
horrible and spectacular (US drone strike, US airstrike). The question about water and land tenure
is maybe less spectacular and sometimes not as obvious as
attacks from Al-Shabaab or other different groups. But the whole conflict about
water and land tenure is crucial when we want to have an end of the civil war
in Somalia (National conflicts about water). The main problem is that different clans want to have land for
their own usage and claim it as their own (MAYSTADT & ECKER 2014: 19). Of course, they do not want to have
land which is not useful for their clan and as a result many different clans
claim the same regions as their own property. The most wanted land is the
region around the rivers Juba and Shabelle in the south of Somalia (Juba and Shabelle). Due
to the rivers, it is a very fruitful region and as a result a good place to
live in for many clans. But as I already explained there is a kind of strong
rivalry between different clans and especially this very popular region is
fought. Many small clans used to live in this region but due to the conflict
and its dynamics the two biggest clans (Hawiye and Darod) moved into this
region and started fighting against each other for reaching domination in this
region (Clan politics). In consequence, many smaller clans moved away and many
farmers who stayed in this region now work as a kind of slave for the bigger
clans.
In conclusion, the Somali civil war
is not just about political issues or economic issues but also about water. The
water issue was not one of the trigger of this conflict but now it is a crucial
part of it. And if you want to have an end of this war and a sustainable
solution for this whole region, you have to solve this problem. Otherwise there
will not be a peaceful end to this conflict.
As I mentioned in the beginning, in
the upcoming posts I want to focus on some other aspects of this whole topic.
Maybe I will tell you guys a bit about possible solutions for water conflicts.
I do not just want to talk about solutions and their importance all the time
but do not offer some.
As always, feel free to comment on my entry and share
your opinion!
Friday, 18 November 2016
Differences between "large-scale" conflicts and "small-scale" conflicts
In my second entry I want to
highlight the differences between large scale and small scale conflicts which
deal with water. For that I will shortly present two different conflicts which
took place in the last decade. With this entry, I also want to show very
briefly (there will be another entry about this topic) that there are various
reasons for a (water) conflict, and sometimes the issue of water distribution
can be the trigger and sometimes it is the key issue of a conflict.
Very often a conflict results from
many different problems and not just one. We should always take into
consideration the different lifestyles of different social groups, the
historical context, and the social and ethnic differences. All these variables
can lead to an outbreak of a conflict. Very often, armed conflicts, which deal
with water, only happen on the small scale, for example in villages or in
general in just one single country. Water conflicts between two or more states
often remain on the political or diplomatic stage. The reason for this is quite
obvious. It is simply cheaper and easier to not have a war, than to have a war
(Konflikte und Kooperationen).
One example for this case is the conflict between Egypt and
Ethiopia. This conflict has already existed
for many decades but it almost escalated in 2013. The main issue was that
Ethiopia wanted to build a new dam (Renaissance dam) on the Nile (upstream). Of
course, Egypt was afraid of this project because they feared to lose one of
their most important resources. As a result of this, Egyptian politicians
talked about blowing up the dam or the possible support of Ethiopian rebel
groups which will fight against the government (Wasserkrieg). So, the whole
atmosphere was very overheated and a solution for this big problem was
necessary. But this conflict also shows another dimension. It was not just
about the water and the dam but also about national policy. Both presidents (of
Egypt and Ethiopia) pushed the conflict a little bit to show their population
their strength and power. Especially the president of Ethiopia used this
conflict to get more support from young people (Wasserkrieg). The solution of
this conflict was a treaty which was negotiated by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan,
which shares a border with both countries. Sudan decisively supported the
negotiations and showed Egypt possible advantages of the new dam. After the
negotiations, the Sudanese minister talked about “Hydro-diplomacy”, a term
which will be maybe used more often in the future. This whole conflict shows
what I just mentioned at the very beginning. Conflicts between two or more states
are often solved by cross-border cooperation instead of armed conflicts (TU Berlin). (the picture shows the presidents of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, source: FAZ)
In contrast to this conflict I want
to present a regional conflict between two ethnic groups in Kenya. Since 1992,
there have been various conflicts between Maasai people and Kikuyu people. The Kikuyu
people are the largest ethnic group in Kenya and the Maasai people are one of
the most popular ethnic group in Africa. After the end of colonialization many
different ethnic groups claimed various territories in Kenya as their own. The
Maasai people and Kikuyu people, which usually have a more or less peaceful
relation, also attacked each other to get more land. But it is not just a
conflict about territory and the water which is in this territory, but also a
fight about different lifestyles. The Maasai people are nomads and they
sometimes attack other groups, which settled down at one place, because they
think it is their territory. And this existing small conflict escalated in
2005. The Maasai people blamed the Kikuyu people to steal water from the Ewaso
Kedong River (Rift Valley), which actually belongs to no one (TU Berlin). As a result
of this, Kikuyu people attacked the leader of a regional Maasai village and unfortunately,
they killed him. Of course, this attack led to riots and on the 22nd
of January in 2005, 400 Maasai warriors attacked a Kikuyu village for avenging
their leader. They killed 15 people and more than 10 were injured (FAZ).
Since then, there has not been any
conflict with such terrible consequences but of course this whole event led to
huge social conflicts (WELT).
And as I already mentioned in the
beginning these conflicts are not just about water but they are a mixture of
different problems which can lead to a conflict. The two examples I just
presented to you show that lifestyle, historical context, economic situation,
politics, and social and ethnic conflicts also matter. And they also showed the
difference between “small-scale” conflicts and “large-scale” conflicts. The
conflicts between two states are often about diplomacy and negotiations whereas
the conflicts in one country or a region often lead to riots.
As always, feel free to comment on my entry! If you have any criticism, ideas or thoughts about my text just share it!
Sunday, 16 October 2016
Relationship between water scarcity and (civil) conflicts
Relationship between water scarcity and conflicts
My blog is about water and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and I will focus on conflicts which are about water scarcity in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. For my blog entries it does not matter if the conflict is a small-scale (local conflicts in a village) or a large-scale (international) one. It also does not matter if they are caused by natural phenomenons, the nation state policy or local conditions.
In my first blog entry, I want to clarify the relationship between water scarcity and conflicts. Is there actually any relationship? Why and how do conflicts develop out of water scarcity?
For answering these questions, I read an article written by Nina von Uexkull which was published in 2014. It is called 'Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa' and it is about the question, if there is any relationship between sustained droughts and civil conflicts in the mentioned area in the time from 1989 to 2008 (VON UEXKULL 2014: 15).
Approximately one third of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa lives in drought-prone areas and due to climate change, stress on water resources will increase and population will face new challenges. So far, most of the households in Sub-Saharan Africa developed different strategies to prepare for and cope with droughts. Lots of people migrate during droughts or you support each other in your community with the help of social networks. But especially during longer droughts these strategies often fail and people are forced to sell their key productive assets. Once someone reached this point, even a period of normal rainy seasons may not be enough for recovering (VON UEXKULL 2014: 16).
But where is the connection between water scarcity, or in this certain case sustained droughts, and civil conflicts?
So far, there has not been scientific evidence for a link between climate variability and civil conflicts. But the author of the article tries to show that there is one. As already mentioned, there are lots of problems with which a person in Sub-Saharan Africa has to struggle during sustained droughts (loss of key productive essets, mental problems, reduced crop productivity). All of these problems, of course, change the way of thinking of a person. The consequences of a drought can therefore, for example, lead to increasing grievances. This kind of anger can be a very fertile ground for a civil conflict, especially when there are already local tensions or communal rivalry a conflict can develop very fast.
The author of the article tried to demonstrate the link between droughts and conflicts with geospatial analysis. For this demonstration she analysed annual observations of grid cells. So she included all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2008 and all droughts in this time in her analysis and compared the relationship between time and space. The result is that droughts substantially increase the risk that a subnational region experiences a civil conflict. In most cases civil conflict events did not take place only because of droughts but droughts mostly added fuel to already existing conflicts and tensions. These results are especially significant in agricultural regions (VON UEXKULL 2014: 21).
In conclusion, the article showed that there is a relationship between droughts and civil conflicts, especially in agricultural regions.
But what does that mean for the future? How can we resolve such conflicts and how do they develop in detail?
Please feel free to ask any questions or criticize! What do you think about the relationship between water scarcity and (civil) conflicts?
My blog is about water and development in Sub-Saharan Africa and I will focus on conflicts which are about water scarcity in Sub-Saharan Africa in general. For my blog entries it does not matter if the conflict is a small-scale (local conflicts in a village) or a large-scale (international) one. It also does not matter if they are caused by natural phenomenons, the nation state policy or local conditions.
In my first blog entry, I want to clarify the relationship between water scarcity and conflicts. Is there actually any relationship? Why and how do conflicts develop out of water scarcity?
For answering these questions, I read an article written by Nina von Uexkull which was published in 2014. It is called 'Sustained drought, vulnerability and civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa' and it is about the question, if there is any relationship between sustained droughts and civil conflicts in the mentioned area in the time from 1989 to 2008 (VON UEXKULL 2014: 15).
Approximately one third of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa lives in drought-prone areas and due to climate change, stress on water resources will increase and population will face new challenges. So far, most of the households in Sub-Saharan Africa developed different strategies to prepare for and cope with droughts. Lots of people migrate during droughts or you support each other in your community with the help of social networks. But especially during longer droughts these strategies often fail and people are forced to sell their key productive assets. Once someone reached this point, even a period of normal rainy seasons may not be enough for recovering (VON UEXKULL 2014: 16).
But where is the connection between water scarcity, or in this certain case sustained droughts, and civil conflicts?
So far, there has not been scientific evidence for a link between climate variability and civil conflicts. But the author of the article tries to show that there is one. As already mentioned, there are lots of problems with which a person in Sub-Saharan Africa has to struggle during sustained droughts (loss of key productive essets, mental problems, reduced crop productivity). All of these problems, of course, change the way of thinking of a person. The consequences of a drought can therefore, for example, lead to increasing grievances. This kind of anger can be a very fertile ground for a civil conflict, especially when there are already local tensions or communal rivalry a conflict can develop very fast.
The author of the article tried to demonstrate the link between droughts and conflicts with geospatial analysis. For this demonstration she analysed annual observations of grid cells. So she included all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2008 and all droughts in this time in her analysis and compared the relationship between time and space. The result is that droughts substantially increase the risk that a subnational region experiences a civil conflict. In most cases civil conflict events did not take place only because of droughts but droughts mostly added fuel to already existing conflicts and tensions. These results are especially significant in agricultural regions (VON UEXKULL 2014: 21).
In conclusion, the article showed that there is a relationship between droughts and civil conflicts, especially in agricultural regions.
But what does that mean for the future? How can we resolve such conflicts and how do they develop in detail?
Please feel free to ask any questions or criticize! What do you think about the relationship between water scarcity and (civil) conflicts?
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